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Agency Activism as a New Way of Life
I. INTRODUCTION
The IRS has begun to get more aggressive. Contrary to what one might
expect, however, this new stance has greatly benefitted taxpayers. Due to a lack
of proper funding, the agency has found itself in an impossible situation when
it comes to enforcing the tax laws. This problem is not new, however, as the
IRS has historically never had enough resources to provide for completely
effective administration of the tax laws. It knows full well that it cannot audit
taxpayers quickly and thoroughly with the resources it currently has. Although
the problem is a familiar one, what the IRS has recently been doing about it is
cause for concern.
In the name of increasing efficiency and better utilizing limited
resources, the IRS has begun to adopt audit policies that overly favor taxpayers
and greatly hinder the IRS's ability to perform thorough audits. Highlighting
this trend is a relatively new audit technique used by the Large to Mid-Size
Business Division (LMSB), which "serves corporations, subchapter S
corporations, and partnerships with assets greater than $10 million."'
When faced with the conflict between currency and thoroughness, the
LMSB has chosen to focus primarily on improving audit currency.2 The LMSB
believes that improved currency will have several positive effects:
A. Taxpayer records will become more easily accessible and
available on current years;
B. Taxpayer personnel familiar with transactions selected for
examination will still be available;
C. There will be the ability to eliminate issues from future
examinations by using resolution tools;
D. There will be the ability to enter into pre-filing actions for
future returns; and
E. There will be the improved employee and customer
satisfaction.'
The LMSB has considered several techniques to improve audit currency, such
as limited scope audits, skip-cycle examinations, multi-year examinations,
1. Large to Mid-Size Business Division Hornepage, at http://www.irs.gov/
business/article/O,,id=103401,00.html.
2. See I.R.M. 4.45.7.2 (2004).
3. I.R.M. 4.45.7.2(1) (2004).
2006]
Florida Tax Review
LMSB sweeps, and accelerated examination plans.4 One of the LMSB's more
imaginative initiatives for improving audit currency is the audit technique
known as the Limited Issue Focused Examination (LIFE) Process. Under LIFE,
the LMSB has attempted to involve taxpayers in the audit process by sharing
responsibility for timely completion of the audit and has attempted to streamline
the audit by reducing the scope of issues examined and applying materiality
thresholds to limit scope expansion.'
Although the LMSB has had success improving audit currency through
the use of LIFE, it is paying too high a price for this result. By instituting LIFE,
the LMSB has exceeded the audit authority congressionally granted to the IRS.
Furthermore, the IRS is doing so without full disclosure to the public of how
LIFE is implemented. In other words, the IRS is in effect legislating without any
political accountability. In addition, although the LMSB believes that it will not
be sacrificing much in the way of quality, this claim does not hold up, especially
when one considers the potential for taxpayer abuse of the program. The fact
that corporate America views tax departments as profit centers almost assures
that LMSB "customers" will be able to exploit the lack of audit thoroughness
to engage in questionable if not outright fraudulent activity. LIFE also greatly
undermines the rule of law because the program misuses discretion and
arbitrarily treats similarly situated taxpayers unequally.
This paper will examine LIFE and whether the LMSB has given up too
much in the name of improving audit currency in a world of insufficient
enforcement resources. Part II will discuss some of the recent budget and
enforcement problems that the IRS has been having. Part III will examine LIFE
and explain the program's specifics. Part IV will analyze whether the IRS has
exceeded its authority in implementing LIFE. Part IV will also address the
IRS's unwillingness to explain fully critical aspects of LIFE to the public. Part
V will explore whether or not LIFE, even if legitimate, is good public policy.
Finally, Part VI concludes that the IRS is indeed sacrificing too much for
improving audit currency through LIFE. By implementing LIFE, it has both
changed the historical relationship between taxpayers and the tax collector, and
it has done so in a manner that it must know that neither Congress nor the public
would sanction.
4. I.R.M. 4.45.7.2(4) (2004).
5. I.R.M. 4.45.7.2(5) (2004).
6. I.R.M. 4.45.7.2(5) (2004).
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II.THE IRS's RECENT BUDGETARY PROBLEMS
PREVENT EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
During at least one of the years from 2001-2003, eighty-two of the
nation's largest corporations did not pay federal income taxes.7 While there are
several causes for such an astounding number,' the IRS's failing ability to
conduct effective audits of a large number of corporate taxpayers is certainly
one of them.
In recent years there has been a marked decline in corporate audit
activity.
9
Only about a third of very large businesses are audited every
year, down from more than half as recently as 1995. Audit
rates for businesses with assets of between $10 million and
$250 million, ... plunged to 10% to 15% in 2001 from 20% to
30% in the early 1990s."
As one commentator has observed:
Tax experts agree that corporate tax avoidance has become a
serious problem. Corporate tax receipts - already in a long,
steady decline - fell to $132 billion in the fiscal year that ended
Sept. 30, [2003] the lowest since 1993, even before adjusting
for inflation. Expressed as a percentage of total tax receipts or
as a share of the economy, corporate tax receipts this year will
7. Kurt Ritterpusch, [CTJ Tallies Corporate Tax Boon Under Bush; 82
Corporations have had a Tax-Free Year,] 184 BNA Daily Tax Rep. G-8, G-8 (Sept. 23,
2004). The rebate checks that were owed to these eighty-two corporations actually
totaled $12.6 billion.
8. Factors like a slower economy, an increasingly complex set of tax structures,
ease of S corporation formation, and the proliferation of stock options have also
contributed to the recent decline in corporate taxation. IRS: Speeding Corporate Tax
Audits, Glass Jacobson's E.Perspective, at
http://www.glassjacobson.com/index.php3?page=270 (Jan. 2004) (hereinafter Glass
Jacobson).
9. Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Putting LIFE on Line in Bid to Improve Corporate
Audits, Chi. Trib., Jan. 6, 2003, at 10.
10. Id.
20061
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be at their second-lowest level since the Great Depression.
Only 1983's receipts were lower."
"With corporate tax receipts at record lows, IRS Commissioner Mark
W. Everson recently declared that corporate audits, which now take an average
of 38 months, should be completed in less than half that time."' 2 The IRS's hope
is that improved audit efficiency will increase audit risk and thereby present a
more constant audit threat to the corporate taxpayer that will in turn lead to
greater compliance. 3 This push for increased efficiency has been the driving
force behind recent IRS internal procedures. 4
The IRS has been relying on an increased budget to accomplish its
goals of improving audit times while maintaining quality. 5 To support its
argument for increased funding, however, the IRS has been trying to show that
it was doing as much as it could with its resources. Commissioner Everson has
stated "that improving the agency's efficiency gave him more ammunition when
it came time for him to plead his case to Congress for a funding boost. In the
meantime,. . .greater efficiency has enabled the agency to cope when it doesn't
11. Glass Jacobson, supra note 8 (brackets added).
12. Id.
13. Id. As will be discussed in more detail in Section V, infra, however, there
is legitimate concern that steps taken to increase audit efficiency may lead to a greater
potential for tax fraud. Id.
14. Allen Kenney, [Official Says IRS Audit Process Still Needs Work,] 105
Tax Notes 27 (Oct. 4, 2004):
On a larger scale, [Deputy IRS Commissioner for Services and
Enforcement Mark E.] Matthews said in his conference speech that
IRS Commissioner Mark Everson's mantra that "time matters" has
reached all comers of the agency, pushing his charges to "ruthlessly
prioritize" their use of resources.
"Nobody feels in the IRS that they are not under the gun in terms of
thinking about how they function and what kind of efficiencies they
can bring," Matthews said. "It's not a message that we don't seek
excellence - it's about making right decisions about resources and
about risk."
Id. (brackets added).
15. Id. at 28. Even without such funding increase, however, the IRS still
planned on moving ahead towards "pursuing its goals of increased enforcement and
improved service." Id.
[Vol7
Agency Activism as a New Way of Life
get the money it asks for."' 6 Everson's funding fears have turned into reality,
and the IRS will thus have to hope that it can continue to increase efficiency
without additional resources in order to make up for funding shortfalls. 7
However, funding problems are nothing new to the IRS. Hoping to
compensate for these problems through increasing efficiency is a laudable goal.
Taking this stance to the point at which efficiency increases are being achieved
by giving away the entire farm, however, and subverting the rule of law, is not
justifiable. Nevertheless, this is what the LMSB is doing with LIFE.
III.THE LMSB's SOLUTION TO A LACK OF RESOURCES:
LIMITED ISSUE FOCUSED EXAMINATION (LIFE)
A. General Overview of LIFE
Because the IRS did not expect to receive additional resources for
enforcement, the LMSB implemented LIFE on December 4, 2002.'s The IRS's
press release summarizes LIFE's basic structure:
This initiative will involve a formal agreement, a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), between the IRS and
16. Allen Kenney, Everson Strong on Enforcement Despite Bleak IRS Funding
Outlook, 105 Tax Notes 503, 503 (Oct. 25, 2004).
17. See Allen Kenney, Everson Evaluates State ofIRS, Pledges Strong Agenda
for 2005, 106 Tax Notes 40 (Jan. 3, 2005). President Bush had requested a 5% IRS
budget increase in 2005 (which comes out to about $490 million). Id. at 41. While
Everson wanted a "10% increase of $134 million over the previous year's budget from
the requested $300 million increase set aside for enforcement:"
Congress, however, appeared to have other plans. When all the
politicking was said and done, the IRS was left with $10.3 billion in
the fiscal 2005 omnibus appropriations bill, a nominal increase of
$134 million over the previous year's budget and $356 million less
than Bush requested.
Id.; see also Stephen Joyce, Everson Letter Says IRS Will Forfeit Billions, Lack
Auditors Unless FY2005 Request is Met, 189 BNA Daily Tax Rep. G-8 (Sept. 30,2004)
for a discussion of Everson's concerns over how funding problems could drastically
reduce the amount of the revenue that the IRS was able to collect.
18. IRS News Release IR-2002-133 (Dec. 4,2002); IRS LIFE Training Video,
received pursuant to FOIA request.
2006]
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taxpayer to govern key aspects of the examination. The MOU
will contain dollar-limit thresholds, established on a case-by-
case basis, below which the IRS will agree not to raise issues
and the taxpayer will agree not to file claims. This will create,
with the taxpayer's assistance, an atmosphere where the
examination process is less difficult, less time-consuming, less
expensive and less contentious for all involved. 9
In addition, an initial risk analysis will significantly restrict the number of issues
to be examined, resulting in situations in which only a small number of issues
are examined while the IRS in effect concedes all others prior to examination.2"
According to the LIFE Training Manual, after identifying as many as fifty
issues "warranting examination," the auditor might work only the top few that
are "most material to the transaction as a whole" thereby conceding almost all
of the other issues warranting examination:
For example, if you had identified 50 areas warranting
examination in your risk analysis, use of the LIFE process
might result in raising the bar to perhaps the 10 or 15 of the
most significant issues. If you had classified your issues as
priority A, B and C for your traditional audit plan, LIFE might
result in only the "A" issues being examined. Depending upon
the circumstances of your examination, LIFE might involve
working only the top few "A" issues. You will use the
principles of risk analysis to isolate those issues that are most
material to the tax return as a whole. 2'
Also, under LIFE, the auditor has the authority to waive certain steps
considered so important in traditional examinations that they are normally
mandatory.22 LIFE resulted from the IRS establishing "best practices" for scope
19. IRS News Release IR-2002-133 (Dec. 4, 2002). See also LMSB LIFE
Training Manual, at 26-7, 32 received pursuant to FOIA request (may not be cited as
official authority) (hereinafter LIFE Training Manual); I.R.M. 4.51.3 (2004).
20. LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 32.
21. LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 32 (emphasis in original).
"However, LIFE does not impact the depth to which issues are examined." I.R.M.
4.51.3.3.6(9) (2004).
22. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.6(4) (2004). The steps that may be waived are:
A. The mandatory income probe;
B. Minimum Inventory Checks;
[Vol 7:7
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limitation from its former practice of informally agreeing with certain corporate
taxpayers to limit audit scope. 23 The LMSB did not develop these best practices
solely based on internal feedback; it also relied on the input from the private
sector.
24
The LMSB has established guidelines for determining when a LIFE
audit is appropriate. These guidelines provide a mechanism to allow the LMSB
to maximize its resources while not applying the taxpayer friendly LIFE
limitations to taxpayers whose behavior does not indicate that a limited audit
C. Mandatory Compliance Checks (the requirement to verify filing
of and reviewing payroll, excise, and pension returns, verify filing
information returns and Forms 8300, Cash Transaction Reports.);
Id.
23. Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Tax Facts: IRS to Streamline Corporate Audits,
Dow Jones Newswires, at http://www.salestax.org/news/thisweeksnewsl 2-6-02.html.
24. The LIFE Training Manual describes how the LMSB consulted with private
interest groups in developing the "best practices:"
After securing information on best practices from within LMSB, we
contacted outside stakeholder groups including the Tax Executives
Institute (TEl), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). In
seeking their input, we crafted nine questions covering specific
problem areas of the examination process. We also invited them to
share examination success stories and best practices they believed to
be important. Surprisingly, many of the key elements in their
"success stories" mirrored those expressed by the examination teams,
including increased communication and participation in the planning
process.
LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 3. Because of the role that these groups were
permitted to play in designing LIFE, taxpayers' enthusiasm for LIFE, as discussed in
Section V.A, infra, is unsurprising.
2006]
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would be appropriate." Despite these guidelines, the LMSB believes that the
application of LIFE should be considered in every audit.26
25. I.R.M. 4.51.3.2.1(1) (2004) provides the following factors as supporting
the use of a LIFE audit:
A. The risk analysis identifies a limited number of material items (no
specific number since this will vary based on the facts and
circumstances);
B. Prior experience indicates the taxpayer is both capable and willing
to meet the commitments required in the MOU;
C. Workload demands exceed resources available and require scope
limitations;
D. Special project cases where the primary issue is identified;
E. Out-of-cycle returns when there is an issue requiring examination
for tax administration purposes;
F. There is no prior examination history of the taxpayer, but the
interaction to date indicates the taxpayer is both capable and willing
to meet the commitments required in the MOU, or
G. Improved currency is a primary concern and the taxpayer is
reasonably compliant, even if there have been issues in the past.
See also LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 5-6 for a more specific breakdown of
the factors supporting a LIFE audit, in which the LMSB establishes separate criteria
depending on whether the audit is an industry case or a Coordinated Industry Case.
IRM 4.51.3.2.1(2) (2004) lists the factors that, either individually or together,
could make a LIFE audit inappropriate:
A. A history of substantial noncompliance, such as aggressive
positions or the use of marketed tax products;
B. A history of failing to consistently meet agreed upon information
Document Request (IDR) response times (including completeness);
C. Average IDR response times that will most likely impede an
efficient examination;
D. A tax shelter transaction that was not properly disclosed as
required by any Notice, Revenue Procedure, Revenue Ruling or
Treasury Regulations;
E. A large number of material issues which render scope limitation
unreasonable;
F. An indication of fraud on the part of the taxpayer, or
G. The taxpayer is unable or unwilling to meet the commitments
required in the MOU.
See also, LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 5-6.
26. I.R.M. 4.51.3.2.1(1) (2004).
[Vol. 7.- 7
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Larry Langdon, the LMSB Commissioner when LIFE was announced,
emphasized that LIFE was meant to be used for cooperative taxpayers." Driving
LIFE, however, was a desire to reduce audit times and maximize the use of
limited resources. 8 In an interview about LIFE, Langdon stated that:
As is true of our corporate taxpayers and their practitioners, the
IRS realizes that we also have limited resources. There are only
about 6,000 employees in LMSB to deal with 150,000
taxpayers with assets exceeding $10 million. Because our
current audit process only allows us to deal with a small
number of our mid-sized taxpayers, we need to revise these
audit procedures to properly increase our audit coverage. The
LIFE Program and our other initiatives will allow LMSB
auditors to do this.
29
27. See, e.g., IRS News Release IR-2002-133 (Dec. 4, 2002). As a result of
reducing the audit times of compliant taxpayers, the IRS hopes through LIFE to be able
to focus on issues often found in non-compliant taxpayers like tax shelters. Terry Carter,
The IRS Wants to save you Time and Money... Seriously: Bigger Businesses With
Good Records Get to Determine Audit Issues in Advance, 2 No. 2 A.B.A. J. E-Rep. 6,
(Jan. 17, 2003). Furthermore, the IRS hopes that LIFE will allow it to focus on more
mid-size businesses by reducing audit times of large corporations. Id.
28. Carter, supra note 27. Langdon indicated that the IRS was auditing returns that
were five years old, and that he was hoping to reduce that number to three years. Id. In fact,
Langdon stated that one of his reasons for leaving the private sector, where he had been a
Hewlett-Packard Vice President and a former president of the Tax Executives Institute, was
to change the LMSB's audit process to result in less documentation and increased coverage.
See Biography of Larry Langdon, at http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers; Interview with
Larry Langdon on Frontline, Nov. 5, 2003, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/interviews/langdon.html.
29. Larry R. Langdon, 81 Taxes 279 (Mar. 1, 2003). The IRS training manual
providing instruction on how to administer LIFE echoes this need for increased efficiency:
"With finite resources, LMSB can only [streamline the process]... by reducing the resources
we devote to some of our traditional examination areas." LIFE Training Manual, supra note
19, at 1 (brackets added); See also LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19 at ii. See also, IRM
4.45.7.2(1) (2004). Increased efficiency will allow it to focus more on its highest
enforcement priorities, which include "[a]busive tax avoidance transactions, . . . executive
compensation, offshore tax avoidance transactions, flow-through entities, special purpose
entities, and financial vs. tax reporting discrepancies." LMSB Compliance Priorities, at
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/article/O,,id= 121348,00.html.
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Langdon summarized the problem that these figures present to the IRS:
That means there are about 148,000 that are not covered as
extensively as we'd like." "We haven't decreed a number, but
we hope that at least a quarter of new case starts use... [LIFE]
principles, and we will be pleased if it's more than that. Then,
we'll have resources to be able to touch more taxpayers, for
lack of a better term, and focus on what's material.3°
B. Differences Between Traditional Limited Scope Examinations and LIFE
Although any audit procedure is inherently discretionary in terms of the
examination's scope, LIFE is distinguishable from other audit procedures in
several critical respects. While some auditors prior to the implementation of
LIFE may have been limiting examined issues to post-LIFE levels, through
LIFE the LMSB is attempting to get all their "agents to leave their comfort zone
and to take some risks in the process," by greatly reducing the number of issues
examined.3' The LMSB is asking taxpayers to do the same thing by agreeing to
leave certain claims off the table and to "share in the responsibility for timely
completion of the examination." 2 More specifically, the LMSB established six
factors that distinguish LIFE from traditional full scope audits:
A. The examination plan is more issue-driven than resource
driven;
B. The scope of the examination is limited based on materiality
concepts;
C. Some mandatory compliance checks and mandatory steps
may be waived;
D. Once the scope is set, it is not necessary to comment on
other LUQ [large, unusual, and questionable] items;
30. Carter, supra note 27. (brackets added).
31. LIFE Consolidated Frequently Asked Questions, Aug. 1, 2003, at 4,
received pursuant to FOIA request (hereinafter LIFE Consolidated FAQ). In providing
an example to its auditors, the LMSB stated that "maybe you will only be able to focus
on category A (will work) issues when in the past you focused on category A and B
(would like to work) issues. In some cases, you might even limit the scope to only some
of the 'A' issues." Id.
32. Id.
[Vol. 7:7
Agency Activism as a New Way of Life
E. Once the scope is set, managerial approval is required to
expand it, and
F. LIFE requires the taxpayer to commit to actions specified in
the LIFE MOU.33
One of the factors, issue limitation, is nothing new as the IRS has for
some time used traditional limited scope examinations.3 4 Traditional limited
scope examinations, however, provide much more discretion in issue expansion
than LIFE does.35 As a result, the LMSB believed that these traditional limited
scope examination procedures were not consistently being applied to LMSB
audits, and the LMSB implemented LIFE, in part, to establish more consistency
with these limited audits.36 The LMSB listed three primary factors of traditional
limited scope audits that distinguish them from LIFE audits:
A. The examiner may only waive gross income and inventory
checks;
B. The limited scope examination can involve only one or two
issues, and
C. There are only a few instances or circumstances where the
traditional, limited scope examination is appropriate, such as
whipsaw issues and other related returns. 7
Thus, through LIFE, the LMSB hopes to provide more uniformity as
well as a broader application of limited scope examinations, which is consistent
with the IRS's stated goal of maximizing the use of its decreasing resources.
33. I.R.M. 4.51.3.1.2(2) (2004) (brackets added).
34. See I.R.M. 4.10.2.6.1 (1999) et seq. for a description of the traditional
limited scope examinations.
35. See I.R.M. 4.10.2.6.1.2(1) (1999) which states at the outset that
"[e]xpanding the scope of the examination is based on the examiner's judgment;" see
also I.R.M. 4.10.2.6.1(3) (1999), which also establishes that "[e]xaminers are expected
to continually exercise judgment throughout the examination process to expand or
contract the scope as needed." This discretion is very different from a LIFE
examination, in which the established materiality thresholds greatly restrict the
examiner's discretion to expand the audit's scope. See Section III.C, infra, for a more
detailed discussion of how the initial risk analysis and subsequent materiality thresholds
impact an examiner's ability to expand a LIFE audit.
36. LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 4-5.
37. I.R.M. 4.51.3.1.2(3) (2004); see also LIFE Frequently Asked Questions,
at 1, received pursuant to FOIA request (hereinafter First LIFE FAQ).
2006]
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Despite the IRS's attempts to create more uniformity and consistency, LIFE's
very nature will result in inconsistent taxpayer treatment, as discussed in Section
V.B.3 further. This inconsistency results from LIFE's overly discretionary
methods of issue selection and determining materiality thresholds.
C. Issue Selection and the Materiality Thresholds
While LIFE consists of many procedural intricacies, at its heart are two
questions: (1) how are issues selected and (2) how are the materiality thresholds
determined. This section will explore what little guidance there is for how the
LMSB makes these determinations.
At the conception of LIFE, the initial plan was to use materiality
thresholds to govern issue selection and scope expansion.3 8 After getting
feedback from the field, however, the LMSB changed this procedure to remove
the consideration of any materiality thresholds in issue selection.39 As will be
discussed further, although specific thresholds are not used in issue selection,
materiality concepts still play a pivotal role in the determination of the
examination's initial scope. What resulted is a process consisting of two
independent steps.4" The first step consists of performing a risk analysis, without
regard to any dollar thresholds, to determine which issues will be examined.4
The second step involves setting the materiality thresholds for scope expansion
by either the IRS or the taxpayer.42 "The thresholds may be the lowest dollar
value selected in the LIFE exam plan or another amount based on the
examiner's professional judgment."'43 To understand how the LMSB makes its
issue and threshold selections, analyzing these two steps separately is helpful.
1. Issue Selection - Initially, "[t]he examiner will perform a risk
analysis in the same manner as in a traditional, full scope examination." In this
38. Interim Review Produces Changes to the LIFE Process, at
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/article/0,,id=103618,00.html (hereinafter Interim
Review); LIFE Consolidated FAQ, supra note 31, at 7.
39. LIFE Consolidated FAQ, supra note 31, at 7.
40. Id.; I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.6(1) (2004).
41. Interim Review, supra note 38; LIFE Consolidated FAQ, supra note 31, at
7; I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.6(1) (2004).
42. Interim Review, supra note 38; LIFE Consolidated FAQ, supra note 31, at
7-8; I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.6(1) (2004).
43. LIFE Consolidated FAQ, supra note 31, at 8.
44. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.3(1) (2004). This provision refers the reader to I.R.M.
4.10.2.4.1 (1999) and I.R.M. 4.45.7.2 (2004) for a discussion of risk analysis.
[Vol. 7:7
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risk analysis, auditors are expected "to effectively manage their workload by
prioritizing the issues so that the issues with higher audit potential are examined
over those with lower potential. Issues with little or no audit potential should
not be selected for examination." '45 The most important issues are generally the
large, unusual, and questionable (LUQ) items.46 Materiality issues are
commonly used to identify these LUQ items.47 Thus, although specific
materiality thresholds are not being used to govern issue selection, materiality48
does come into play at the issue selection step. In fact, according to the Internal
Revenue Manual, materiality considerations are the most important ones in
limiting an audit's scope.49
Several factors come into play in determining materiality. The first and
most basic is the dollar amount of an item- the higher an item's dollar amount,
the more likely it is to have a significant affect on tax liability and thus be
45. IRM 4.10.2.4.1(1) (1999). The LMSB has attempted to come up with a few
examples of factors that might be used to conduct an effective risk analysis:
- The outcome of issues from prior years (was it agreed, unagreed, or
how was the issue ultimately resolved?)
- Is the issue a "must work" item such as a Coordinated Issue or tax
shelter?
- Is the issue an emerging issue?
- Is the item one with a high probability of error? (Some accounts are
inherently more prone to errors than others) consideration of the
resources needed to address the item
- Estimated time to complete the examination of an item
- Materiality
LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 8-9.
Note also that it is unclear from the Internal Revenue Manual whether "high
audit potential" means items in which the IRS is likely to prevail or items that will result
in a high adjustment of tax liability.
46. I.R.M. 4.10.2.4.1 & 4.10.2.6 (1999); LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19,
at 8-9. While the auditor is generally expected to examine all LUQ items, an exception
to this general rule is made when the scope of an examination is to be limited. Id.
47. LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 8-9.
48. "Materiality is an accounting concept which does not exist, for the most
part, in tax law. Materiality is both a qualitative and quantitative concept used in
identifying those items most relevant and consequential in determining the correct tax
liability." I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.4(1) (2004).
49. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.4(3) (2004).
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material." A second critical materiality question is, in the case of two equal
dollar amount items, which item will have the more permanent effect on tax
liability (thus becoming more material)?5 Timing also plays a key role in
materiality, and timing adjustments that affect a larger deferral/acceleration
period are considered to be the more material timing adjustments.52 More
qualitative factors, such as "significant transactions involving a tax haven
entity," or even the absence of an item, can also be factored into a materiality
analysis, even if quantitative numbers cannot be attached to them.53
2. Materiality Thresholds - After the risk analysis has been performed
and the issues have been selected, the auditor must establish the materiality
thresholds54 that will determine whether the IRS or the taxpayer will be
permitted to add any other item discovered during the audit to the agreed audit
50. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(1) (2004). Note that "[c]ertain transactions or events may
be of such a nature that it is difficult to associate a dollar amount for materiality without
significant audit work. The fact that there is no specific dollar amount associated with
an issue should not exclude it from consideration under LIFE." I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(7)
(2004). Also note that high dollar amount might not always be indicative of an item that
would have a material effect on tax liability. For example, if an item had a very high
dollar amount but a very low profit margin, it might not involve a significant amount of
taxable income.
51. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(2) (2004).
52. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(3) (2004). Changes in accounting should be considered
in regards to certain timing issues. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(4) (2004). In addition, even an
issue that might not be material from a timing perspective could be material if it
involves a large enough amount. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(5) (2004).
53. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(7) & (9) (2004). Examples of other qualitative factors
include:
A. A taxpayer who has experienced a number of mergers and
acquisitions during the cycle;
B. Non-deductible personal expenses or shareholder distributions;
[and]
C. Employment tax compliance
I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(7) (2004).
54. The plural "thresholds" is used because one materiality threshold does not
necessarily apply to all items. For example, in the IRS's Instructions for Completing the
MOU, the IRS states that a different threshold could be established for each item. See
Instructions for Completing the MOU, Revised Aug. 1, 2003, at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/mou8_1-03.pdf.
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scope.5" The LMSB implemented the concept of materiality thresholds to
combat "scope creep," which many LMSB field teams said often contributed to
prolonged audits. 6 The auditor must state these thresholds as a specific dollar
amount, which "may be based on the lowest dollar value for each type of issue
included in the LIFE plan or another amount based on the examiner's
professional judgment."57 These thresholds can apply to issues as well as to
"any tax return line item, tax attribute, or a combination of any of the above."'"
The scope can be expanded to include certain high priority issues, however,
regardless of whether or not they fall within the materiality thresholds. 9 These
high priority issues are: "tax shelters, coordinated issues, fraudulent items, items
contrary to public policy, worker classification issues, executive compensation,
and LMSB Field Directive issues.'" ° These thresholds do not have to be the
same for the entire audit period, and it is conceivable that the auditor might have
to establish different materiality thresholds for different taxable years.6'
If the auditor does plan on expanding the audit's scope, he must obtain
managerial approval.62 This approval is required regardless of whether the
expansion satisfies the materiality thresholds.63 This is because the LMSB has
decided that for scope expansion there should be virtually no professional
discretion allowed to the audit team.64 Even if scope expansion is possible, a
manager may decide not to expand the audit's scope if other perceived resource
considerations indicate that the scope should not be expanded.65
As can be seen, LIFE both dramatically limits the number of issues that
will be audited and, in effect, concedes many other issues even when the auditor
has established that they warrant examination. This institutionalized, severe
55. Note, however, that if an item is selected for audit, the materiality
thresholds will not affect the depth to which that item is audited. I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(7)
(2004).
56. LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 20.
57. I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(2) (2004).
58. I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(4) (2004).
59. I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(8) (2004).
60. I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(8); I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(11) (2004). Note also that certain
"obvious computational/mathematical or accounting errors/omissions" can be corrected
without regard to materiality thresholds. I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(9) (2004). The LMSB can
also expand the scope without regards to the materiality thresholds if the taxpayer has
not followed a "stated accounting policy or practice." I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(10) (2004).
61. First LIFE FAQ, supra note 37, at 7.
62. I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(12) (2004).
63. LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 20.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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audit constraint is hardly conducive either to assuring compliance by the
taxpayers under audit or to instilling in those not under audit the proper respect
for the system. LIFE is not just a new technical way of auditing; it represents a
radically different approach in the philosophy and goals of auditing. One is left
to ask whether the IRS can enact such an entirely different approach without
prior congressional approval and oversight.
IV. Is LIFE A LEGITIMATE USE OF THE IRS's AUDIT
AUTHORITY OR AN ILLEGITIMATE SECRET LAW?
A. LIFE is an Inappropriate Use of the IRS's Statutory Audit Authority.
In analyzing LIFE's implications, the first issue that must be addressed
is whether the IRS even has the authority to conduct a LIFE audit. Generally,
the IRS derives its authority to conduct an audit from IRC section 7602(a). This
Code section's language is critical in determining exactly what the IRS is
authorized to do. Specifically, the Code states, in relevant part:
A. Authority to Summon, Etc. - For the purpose of
ascertaining the correctness of any return,... determining the
liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . . or
collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized -
(1) to examine any books, papers, records, or other data which
may be relevant or material to such inquiry"
The Code on its face limits the IRS to examining only documents that
are "relevant and material" to "ascertaining the correctness of any return."
Congress has not required the IRS to examine every taxpayer for every item for
every year nor has it explicitly outlawed any examination that did not result in
"ascertaining the correctness of any return." Congress emphasizes this point
further by preventing any "unnecessary examinations or investigations" as well
as providing a general limitation of one examination per taxable year.67
LIFE, however, is an illegitimate expansion of the IRS's audit authority.
LIFE, by definition, cannot lead to "ascertaining the correctness of any return."
In LIFE, the IRS is not just limiting the scope of its examination to the items
66. IRC § 7602(a). The IRS's general authority to issue regulations is found
in IRC § 7805.
67. IRC § 7605(b).
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that are relevant to "ascertaining the correctness of any return." By limiting the
scope of an audit and establishing a materiality threshold below which items are
ignored, it is intentionally ignoring information that may very well be highly
relevant in "ascertaining the correctness" of a corporate taxpayer's return.
Indeed, the IRS admits that LIFE would result in the examination of only a few
of potentially fifty issues that warranted examination.6" Such an
acknowledgment inherently recognizes that LIFE cannot ascertain "the
correctness of any return" because both the IRS and the taxpayer are
intentionally leaving issues worthy of audit off the table. The IRS's stated
justification for the vast reduction in the number of issues examined as well as
the strict restriction on issue expansion is only one of improved efficiency rather
than one of better "ascertaining the correctness of any return." Thus, LIFE does
not fall within the IRS's congressional authority to examine all information that
is relevant to "ascertaining the correctness of any return."
The Code gives no grant of authority to the IRS to avoid relevant
information intentionally in the name of efficiency. The IRS, however, has
inappropriately given itself authority to conduct LIFE through the regulations
under IRC section 7602. In Treasury Regulation section 301.7602-1 (a), the IRS
slightly but significantly changed the statutory language that grants its audit
authority. Rather than stating that the IRS is "authorized" to examine the
information described in the statute, the regulation states that the IRS "may"
examine this information. 69By making this language much more permissive, the
IRS has given itself authority to choose not to examine materials that may very
well be relevant to "ascertaining the correctness of any return." Surely Congress
did not intend to authorize the IRS to intentionally ignore relevant tax liability.
Such an authorization would give the IRS an enormous amount of power to
decide arbitrarily to audit relevant information in one taxpayer and ignore the
same relevant information in another taxpayer. If Congress truly did intend this
result, it would have made this intention plain.
Furthermore, Congress certainly knows how to state directly that it is
willing to allow the use of thresholds similar to those used in LIFE. For
example, IRC section 6051(a)(13) requires an employer to furnish to its
employees who participate in nonqualified deferred compensation plans a
written statement showing "the total amount of deferrals for the year." The flush
language to IRC section 6051 (a), however, states that "the Secretary may (by
regulation) establish a minimum amount of deferrals below which" such
statement is not required. In this example, Congress has specifically authorized
68. See example from LIFE Training Manual discussed in Section III.A, supra.
69. Regs. § 301.7602-1(a).
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the IRS to employ the use of a threshold. In the unlikely event that Congress
wanted to allow the IRS to establish thresholds below which errors in
computing tax liability could be ignored, it is perfectly capable of granting
Treasury this authority. If Congress felt that, having established a reporting rule,
it also had to establish an exception to the rule, one can imagine that, having
authorized the IRS to audit taxpayer returns to determine their correctness, it
would certainly reserve the right to establish an exception to the rule,
particularly an exception that in effect eviscerated the rule.
In addition to knowing about how to authorize Treasury's use of
thresholds, Congress also knows how to provide a broad grant of authority
clearly permitting the establishment of thresholds through the regulations. In a
recent Notice, the IRS has requested comments on the potential use of
thresholds for reporting of taxable acquisitions under IRC sections 6043(c) and
6045.7o These Code sections state explicitly that the filing of information under
these sections shall only occur to the extent that the Secretary requires it.7 Thus,
for these Code sections, the Secretary has regulatory authority to establish
thresholds for the reporting requirement. This could be why the IRS actually felt
confident promulgating regulations for establishing thresholds under these
taxable acquisition code sections as opposed to establishing the thresholds
without promulgating regulations. Had Congress desired to provide similar
authority to the IRS in the context of LIFE, it could have easily done so. Its
failure to do so does not give the IRS the right to circumvent the regulatory
process by initiating the program administratively.
The IRS'sjustification for establishing LIFE through questionable legal
authority is that it needs to compensate for the fact that it does not have the
resources to follow Congress' authorization to examine information to ascertain
the correctness of a taxpayer's return. Gregg Polsky has argued that the
Treasury Department has increasingly been trying to achieve positive policy
results even if they contradict direct legal authority. 72 Polsky argues that
Treasury has three options if it perceives a difficulty in tax administration:
"(1) propose legislation to Congress to fix the problem, (2) promulgate
regulations that fix the problem in a taxpayer-adverse manner, or (3) promulgate
regulations that fix the problem in a taxpayer-friendly manner. 73 Polsky
70. IRS Notice 2005-7, 2005-3 I.R.B. 340.
71. IRC §§ 6043(c); 6045(a).
72. Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L.
Rev. 185 (2004) (arguing that the check-the-box regulations contradict established
Supreme Court authority in Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)).
73. Id. at 188-9.
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correctly argues that a congressional solution is the only valid one, but "[t]he
Treasury, however, has recently shown a tendency to choose option number (3)
(fix the problem in taxpayer-friendly manner)."74 Polsky's argument resonates
regarding LIFE. LIFE is extraordinarily taxpayer-friendly because of the
restrictions on issue selection and audit expansion.75 Treasury is apparently
trying to solve the problem of its insufficient resources by creating a program
that is unlikely to trigger any taxpayer complaint.76
The IRS is aware of these arguments against LIFE. In fact, the IRS
directly contemplated whether it had congressional authority for LIFE early on
when it was developing its internal guidelines for LIFE. In response to the
argument that LIFE directly conflicts with provisions of the Code that
74. Id. at 189.
75. The IRS would likely argue that the application of materiality thresholds
to taxpayers' claims as discussed in Section III.A, supra, counteracts any overly
taxpayer-friendly effects. This aspect of LIFE likely does little to lessen LIFE's pro-
taxpayer effects. In the audit context, it is the IRS that is much more likely to want to
raise additional issues. Taxpayers, especially profit-minded corporations with
sophisticated tax advisers, have most likely already taken all of the deductions that they
believe are even remotely available and have excluded all items that might remotely be
argued not to be income.
76. See note 24 for a discussion of the private interest groups that LMSB
consulted with in designing LIFE. Such consultation is akin to the farmer consulting
with the fox on appropriate ways to guard the hen house, and thus the taxpayer-friendly
nature of LIFE is easy to understand.
In addition to the fact that taxpayers would likely not complain about the
program, the IRS knows that taxpayers will be unable to challenge LIFE, even if the
program is invalid. Gregg Polsky argues a similar idea with regards to the check the box
regulations:
A more cynical explanation is that the Treasury was aware of the
regulations' invalidity yet issued them anyway because it severely
discounted the likelihood of any judicial challenge. Under this view,
the Treasury intentionally promulgated invalid regulations but
determined that the regulations were insulated from a challenge due
the very restrictive taxpayer standing doctrine discussed below. If,
however, the Treasury had this troubling view, it was short-sighted
because, although a taxpayer with standing to challenge the
regulations might be hard to find, it is inevitable that such taxpayers
exist.
Polsky, supra note 72, at 238-9.
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specifically treated how taxpayers should handle certain items, the IRS stated
in an early version of an internal frequently-asked-questions document: "It is the
IRS' obligation to efficiently utilize its resources. We do not think that Congress
would dispute comparing potential benefits from examining an area to the
resources required to perform the examination."" Merely stating this, however,
does not make it so. The IRS is basically assuming congressional support for its
actions rather than directly asking Congress for authority to implement LIFE.
The IRS is, thus, justifying taking on a legislative function based solely on its
questionable assertion that Congress would approve. Such action is legally
inappropriate even if one believes that the IRS is adopting LIFE as a good way
to deal with the very real problem of diminishing enforcement resources.78 In
77. First LIFE FAQ, supra note 37, at 10. The full question and answer reads:
Based on information presented to me, it is my impression that if the
taxpayer had expensed an item that has normally been capitalized
over a 3-year life, I would not propose an adjustment. Is this correct?
If I am correct, isn't this in direct conflict with the IRC and the intent
of Congress?
In most cases, a timing issue such as the one described in your
question would not result in a material impact on the returns as a
whole. There may be instances where the size of a short-term timing
item would cause it to be material, in which case the item would be
selected for examination. In addition, agents cannot ignore
requirements involving a Change in Accounting Method.
It is the IRS' obligation to efficiently utilize its resources. We do not
think that Congress would dispute comparing potential benefits from
examining an area to the resources required to perform the
examination. Yes, you have found the issue without having to
perform much examination work. However, the compliance impact
of spreading the deferral over the three years may not be material
enough to support the time spent.
78. See Polsky, supra note 72, at 187 (arguing that invalidity of the check-the-
box regulations was not eliminated by the fact that they represented sound tax policy).
A recent example involving the IRS's desire to assist victims of the 2004 hurricane
season also illustrates this point. In response to the devastating property losses in
Alabama, Florida, and Ohio, the IRS issued several notices in which owners of property
that qualified for the low-income housing credit could provide temporary housing to
individuals displaced by the hurricanes. Notice 2004-74, 2004-48 I.R.B. 875; Notice
2004-75, 2004-48 I.R.B. 876; Notice 2004-76, 2004-48 I.R.B. 878. The property owners
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fact, the IRS has sensed the weakness of its justification, as the question about
whether LIFE exceeds the IRS's congressional authority is conspicuously
absent from the final version of the frequently-asked-questions document.7 9
B. The IRS's Unwillingness to Disclose Certain Aspects of LIFE Raises a
Presumption that the IRS is Exceeding its Audit Authority through LIFE.
By acting on its own and without affording the public any opportunity
to be heard, the IRS has in effect created a secret law applicable to a limited
group of taxpayers. The IRS has compounded the problem by its unwillingness
to disclose certain key components of LIFE to the public. As can be seen from
the discussion of issue selection and materiality thresholds discussed earlier, the
IRS has provided general guidelines as to how these processes are
accomplished. The IRS, however, has not provided any clear indication of (i)
the amounts of the materiality thresholds it is establishing, (ii) how it establishes
these thresholds, or (iii) how it will determine which issues to examine and
which to ignore. In fact, in a speech on February 1,2001, Larry Langdon stated
that he was "frankly surprised at how large" the materiality thresholds being
used were, but he refused to say what these thresholds were."° Rather, the IRS
has chosen to cloak these specifics behind general statements that each
taxpayer's differences make it impossible to come up with any specific,
meaningful guidelines for determining materiality thresholds.
Even finding the guidelines is not easy. Apart from what was available
in the Internal Revenue Manual, most of the information discussed in this article
was obtained through a document request to the IRS under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).81 That request asked for all IRS documents, including
could provide this temporary housing regardless of income, without fear of losing their
low-income housing credit under IRC § 42 (2004). Id. No one could doubt the benefits
of helping those displaced by hurricanes. Nevertheless, this action provides yet another
example of the IRS changing a section of the Code without congressional authority. It
is for the legislative, not the administrative, branch to change the law and to decide
whether the government should be helping hurricane victims through the tax code.
79. See LIFE Consolidated FAQ, supra note 31.
80. Larry Langdon, (Feb. 1, 2001), ABA-177 IRS's New Toolbox to Resolve
Tax Disputes: Pre-Filing Technical Guidance and Other Initiatives.
81. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2004). The FOIA request to the IRS, submitted on
November 1, 2004, requested the following documents:
1. All Memoranda of Understanding ("MOUs") entered into between
the IRS and taxpayers pursuant to the Limited Issue Focused
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MOUs, that might shed light on how the IRS conducts issue selection and
materiality threshold determinations under LIFE. While the IRS produced a
variety of documents, it refused to provide copies of completed MOUs. These
documents would provide data on the specific materiality thresholds that the
IRS used for corporate taxpayers from July 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003. In
refusing to produce the MOUs, the IRS stated in its response:
Examination ("LIFE") program in the Large and Medium Sized
Business ("LMSB") division from July 1, 2003 through December
31, 2003.
2. All documents prepared or used by the IRS to determine the scope
and the materiality thresholds for MOUs, as these concepts are
described in sections 4.51.3.3 and 4.51.3.4 of the Internal Revenue
Manual. For your convenience, a copy of these sections of the
Internal Revenue Manual is attached. This request includes, but is not
limited to, a request for any general guidance, policies, or procedures
that the IRS has prepared or used to determine the scope and
materiality thresholds in the LIFE program as a whole as well as the
specific documents relating to scope and materiality thresholds
established in the MOUs provided pursuant to Request No. 1.
3. All documents prepared or used by the IRS to determine which
taxpayers will be offered to have their audits conducted under the
LIFE program. This request includes, but is not limited to, a request
for any general guidance, policies, or procedures that the IRS has
prepared or used to determine which taxpayers generally are offered
to have their audits conducted under the LIFE program as well as the
specific documents relating to how the taxpayers who entered into the
MOUs provided pursuant to Request No. 1 were determined to be
eligible to have their audits conducted under the LIFE program.
4. All training materials prepared or used by the IRS to train its
personnel to administer audits under the LIFE program, including,
but not limited to, training materials prepared or used by the IRS to
train its personnel to determine selection of taxpayers for
participation in the LIFE program and/or to establish the scope and/or
materiality thresholds in the LIFE program (described in requests 2
and 3).
Letter from Walter Edward Afield to Maureen Sapero, FOIA Disclosure
Manager, (Nov. 1, 2004).
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All documents are being released to you in their entirety with
the exception of the deleted information that is being withheld
in accordance with subsection 5 U.S.C. (b)(3) and (b)(6) of the
Freedom of Information Act. The statute for the (b)(3)
exemption is 26 U.SC. 6103. The documents contain taxpayer
identifiers and information that would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
LIFE memoranda are part of a taxpayers examination file and
therefore, "return information" which is not releasable in
accordance with subsection 5 U.S.C. (b)(3) of the Freedom of
Information Act. However, we have enclosed a copy of the
LIFE MOU template for your information. 2
In withholding the MOUs, the IRS is preventing the public from having
any significant knowledge about which specific return items will meet the
criteria for audit under LIFE and what amounts of potential tax liability will be
ignored under the materiality thresholds. Under case law discussed further in
this section, whether the IRS has the authority to withhold this information in
the face of a FOIA request depends on whether a court would consider the
information to be useful in allowing taxpayers to circumvent audits or would
consider disclosure of the information as serving a positive public purpose.
Under FOIA and IRC section 6103 (which prohibits the disclosure of
return information), the IRS would likely argue that the withheld information
is analogous to discriminant function scores (DIFs), an investigatory technique
that the IRS uses internally to select tax returns for an audit.8 3 Courts have
routinely held it permissible for the IRS to withhold these DIF scores under 5
U.S.C. section 552 and IRC section 6103' because "[r]elease of this
information could compromise the integrity of the IRS and its regulatory
function by allowing individuals to manipulate their DIF scores and possibly
82. Letter from Maureen Sapero, Manager HQ Disclosure Office to Walter
Edward Afield (Jan. 28, 2005) (hereinafter Response).
83. See Buckner v. IRS, 25 F.Supp.2d 893, 898 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
84. FOIA contains a list of exceptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2004).
Specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) protects documents that are exempt under another
statute from disclosure. IRC § 6103 is one such statute, as this section of the Internal
Revenue Code protects taxpayer return information from disclosure. For a full
discussion, see the cases cited in note 85.
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avoid a well-deserved audit." 5 Courts have extended this reasoning outside of
the DIF score context and have applied it to other internal IRS practices and
procedures that taxpayers could use to avoid audit selection. 6 Furthermore,
under IRC section 6103, the IRS can legitimately withhold information that
constitutes taxpayer "return information." Courts have even held that redaction
of certain portions of a document containing "return information" (such as
redacting a taxpayer's name or tax identification number) will not necessarily
allow the IRS to disclose the redacted document.8 7
These cases do present strong arguments for the IRS to withhold the
MOUs. The IRS would likely argue that the MOUs contain corporate taxpayer
information that is protected and that even redaction of the corporate taxpayer
identities would not remove this protection. In addition, the IRS would likely
argue that disclosure of MOUs containing a list of the issues selected for
examination, as well as the materiality thresholds used, would allow taxpayers
to manipulate their returns to avoid detection of certain items that should be
subject to audit.88
Authority does exist, however, that could be used to support disclosure
of MOUs, or at least a statistical compilation of what issues are audited and
85. Buckner, 25 F.Supp.2d at 898 (citations omitted); e.g., Gillin v. IRS, 980
F.2d 819, 822 (1 st Cir. 1992); Long v. IRS, 891 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1989); Pully v.
IRS, 939 F.Supp. 429,438 (E.D. Va. 1996); Lamb v. IRS, 871 F.Supp. 301, 304 (E.D.
Mich. 1994).
86. See e.g., United States v. Imbrunone, 379 F.Supp. 256 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(protecting from disclosure numerous documents relating to IRS investigatory
techniques and selection of taxpayers for audit); Flamingo Fishing Corp. v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 625, 630 (1991) (protecting disclosure of "the IRS's past practices in
determining through specific audits over an 8- to 1 0-year period that crew members of
a scalloper were subject to income taxes because the normal size of the crew was not
fewer than 10.").
87. See e.g., Long, 891 F.2d at 223-24; Church of Scientology ofTexas v. IRS,
816 F.Supp. 1138, 1150 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (citing Church of Scientology of California
v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 19 (1987)). These cases hold that, while mere redaction is not
sufficient to allow disclosure, if the information was compiled into some sort of
statistical data analysis, it could be produced.
88. Note that the IRS has not, as of the writing of this paper, raised this
argument in response to the author's FOIA request. See Response, supra note 82. Were
this issue to actually be litigated, however, this argument could potentially be available
to the IRS. Note, however, that this argument is based on taxpayers' inherent desire to
buck the system, while LIFE is premised on taxpayers' honesty. See infra Section V.
The IRS appears to have a flexible view of taxpayers' ethics..
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what materiality thresholds are used.89 Should the IRS ever prepare a statistical
compilation of the materiality thresholds and issues selected in a series of
MOUs, as discussed earlier, the IRS would probably not be able to rely on its
privacy argument to prevent disclosure. Thus, the IRS would likely have to rely
on the argument that disclosure of such a compilation would allow taxpayers to
avoid being audited.
An older case out of the Sixth Circuit presents a potential solution to
this argument. In Hawkes v. IRS, ° the Court stated that certain IRS guidelines
relating to audit selection should be produced. One of the documents made
available to the public was section 6.051 of the Return Classifier's Handbook,
which listed "the average ratio of officers' salaries to gross income in various
types of businesses."' The IRS argued against disclosure "presumably on the
ground that knowledge of the table's specific ratios would encourage
corporations not to report salaries in excess of the averages, with the hope of
avoiding an audit concerning the reasonableness of their deductions for officers'
salaries."'92 Holding that the information should be available to the public, the
Court stated:
Information which merely enables an individual to conform his
actions to an agency's understanding of the law applied by that
agency does not impede law enforcement and is not excluded
from compulsory disclosure .... Far from impeding the goals
of law enforcement, in fact, the disclosure of information
clarifying an agency's substantive or procedural law serves the
very goals of enforcement by encouraging knowledgeable and
voluntary compliance with the law....
Disclosure... would give the public a rough notion of what
salaries may be unreasonable for corporate deduction purposes,
in the view of the enforcing agency - the IRS. The sole effect
of disclosure of this information would not be easier evasion of
the tax laws. Rather, companies taking unreasonable
deductions would be encouraged to reduce their officers'
salaries to within the ranges specified ... , and companies
wishing substantially to exceed the average range would be on
89. See supra note 87.
90. 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 484 (quoting Return Classifier's Handbook § 6.051).
92. Id.
20061
Florida Tax Review
notice that proof of the reasonableness of the higher salary
deductions would probably be required by an IRS auditor.93
The Hawkes rationale could be applied to support production of the
MOUs. Hawkes could be applied on a broader scale to stand for the proposition
that disclosure should occur if there is a significant public interest favoring
disclosure and minimal to zero risk of abuse. Cases analyzing FOIA's provision
protecting internal agency records from disclosure further support this view.94
Applying this rationale, a taxpayer arguing for IRS disclosure could
make the argument that the materiality thresholds and selected issues will not
help taxpayers circumvent selection for audit because a taxpayer has already
been selected for audit when LIFE is employed. Granted, knowing the issues
that are selected and knowing the materiality thresholds could still allow a
taxpayer to keep items from being included in a LIFE examination. However,
if the IRS is correct in its assertion that taxpayer differences prevent application
of uniform materiality thresholds to all taxpayers,95 then the taxpayers will not
be able to avoid audit by knowledge of the thresholds that have been applied to
other taxpayers because the thresholds will not be the same.
Furthermore, the IRS is essentially creating a secret law in which
material relevant to an audit is intentionally ignored for certain taxpayers
without any type of congressional approval, oversight, or opportunity for the
public to be heard. All of the guidelines that the IRS has created to determine
issues and materiality thresholds under LIFE basically boil down to the IRS
providing general guidance to its personnel and stating that actual
determinations have to be made under the auditor's discretion on a case-by-case
basis. Therefore, if examples of what these issues or thresholds are remain
secret, the IRS will have succeeded in fundamentally changing the law relating
to taxpayer audits without the public's knowledge. Such secrecy creates a
political accountability problem and inherently compromises LIFE's integrity.
Full disclosure is the only solution to these problems so that the people and their
elected representatives can know what new law the IRS has created without
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. Church of Scientology, 816 F.Supp. at 1148-49 (citations omitted)
(discussing "Exemption 2". of FOIA found in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), which protects
internal agency records, and stating that "[r]ecords are exempt under Exemption 2 if
they are internal records that (1) relate to trivial agency matters of which the public does
not have a legitimate interest or (2) if disclosure would risk circumvention of an agency
regulation.").
95. See infra Section V.B.3.
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authorization and can make their own decisions about whether this program is
sound policy. Therefore, while the IRS might be able to withhold individual
MOUs based on privacy concerns, it should disclose any statistical compilation
of MOU data it has because of this high public interest and the fact that
taxpayers cannot avoid audit selection with this knowledge.' Although
encouraging greater disclosure is important, this analysis naturally leads to a
broader question of whether LIFE is in fact good public policy, regardless of
any legitimacy concerns that exist.
V. EVEN IF LIFE IS LEGITIMATE, IS IT GOOD POLICY?
A. Public Arguments Supporting LIFE
The IRS has taken an aggressive approach in claiming LIFE's
advantages. Commissioner Mark Everson has stated publicly that he believes
that decreasing audit times will lead to more revenue because corporations will
realize that they will be more likely to be audited because the IRS will be able
to perform more, though less comprehensive, audits. 7 Everson expressed
96. Note that whether the IRS possesses any such statistical compilations is
unclear. It did not produce any as responsive to the FOIA request nor did it
acknowledge whether they exist or, if they exist, whether it viewed them as part of the
protected "return information" it withheld. See Response, supri note 82.
The IRS's refusal to produce all of the requested documents is consistent with
a recent culture of secrecy that has pervaded the IRS. See Federal Lawsuit Filed Today
Against IRS is Part of Broad Effort to Provide Information About Agency's Audit
Activities to the Public, Apr. 14, 2005, at http://trac.syr.edu/foia/ (last visited Jun. 6,
2005) [hereinafter Federal Lawsuit]; see also Dangers Posed by IRS Secrecy, at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/latest/current/include/side-l.html (last visited Jun. 6, 2005).
Susan B. Long, a co-director of Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC)
and one of the plaintiffs currently suing the IRS for its refusal to comply with a TRAC
FOIA request, argues: "Because a fair, effective and open tax system is so important to
the nation, the IRS's new wave of secrecy about its operations is deeply disturbing and
if left uncorrected could well undermine public confidence along with taxpayer
compliance." Federal Lawsuit supra note 96. Id. Her co-director and co-plaintiff in the
action against the IRS, David Burnham, adds: "From my research, it appears the IRS is
reverting to its habits in the 1950s and 1960s, when secrecy was the norm and the
problems of corruption and political abuse were later uncovered by the Congress." Id.
A copy of TRAC's complaint in Long v. IRS, No. 05-0756 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2005) can
be found at http://trac.syr.edu/foia/complaint.pdf. Id.
97. Jonathan Weisman, IRS Speeds Corporate Tax Audits; Fast-Track Method
May Miss Fraud, The Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 2003, at AO1.
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disgust with the fact that because of the historically slow pace of audits, the IRS
could not be a key figure in discovering the wave of the 1990s corporate
scandals. 98 Everson hoped that LIFE would help combat the "atrocious" statistic
that a mid-size company usually faces one audit every twenty years." Former
IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti agreed that the historical audit pace was in
dire need of improvement to increase the overall amount of collected revenue:
"'Does it make sense spending literally five or six years auditing routine matters
that won't produce much when there are people out there promoting billion-
dollar shelters in the open market?""'
Recent data seems to support the IRS's claim that LIFE is increasing
audit currency. The current Commissioner of the LMSB, Deborah Nolan, has
stated that "[t]he overall [audit] currency rate has increased from 37% in 2003
to 47% in 2004.. . ."'0' Although Nolan did not single out LIFE as the cause of
this improvement, "[s]he attributed much of that success to the issue
management tools the LMSB has developed to reduce its aging inventory of
cases."'
102
LIFE's benefits are more evident when one compares the audit rates of
LMSB taxpayers with the audit rates of small businesses:
The overall audit rate for [corporations with $10 million or
more]... rose almost 40% from a record low of 7,125 in 2003
to 9,500 in 2004. The Service also increased its examination
coverage of the country's largest corporations, those with
assets of at least $250 million, from 30% in 2003 to 40% in
2004.°3
This increase in audit rate for LMSB taxpayers contrasts with the
decrease in audit rate for small businesses (which do not qualify for LIFE by
virtue of not being covered by the LMSB) which "fell from 0.58% in 2003 to
0.32% in 2004 - a 45% drop.""° How much of this increase in LMSB audits is
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Kenneth A. Gary, Enforcement Remains Priority for LMSB, Nolan Says,
105 Tax Notes 504, 504-5 (Oct. 25, 2004).
102. Id.
103. Allen Kenney, Everson Evaluates State of IRS, Pledges Strong Agenda
for 2005, 106 Tax Notes 40, 40-1 (Jan. 3, 2005).
104. Id. at 41.
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directly attributable to LIFE, however, is unclear as TRAC has credited the
numbers to an increase in correspondence audits over "face-to-face" audits. 5
Unsurprisingly, LIFE has received high praise from the taxpayers that
are eligible for the program. An IRS survey of LMSB audited taxpayers whose
cases the LMSB closed between October 2002 and September 2003 revealed
that taxpayers were very satisfied with LIFE."° In addition, Deputy LMSB
Commissioner Bruce Ungar has pointed out that LIFE's popularity has
increased from 2002 to 2004.107
Tax Executives Institute ("TEl"), whose members are almost entirely
assigned to the LMSB, has been a strong advocate of LIFE: °s
105. Id.:
One study, published following the IRS's release of the
2003 enforcement data, noted that most of the ballyhooed boosts in
audit coverage were attributable to the agency's growing use of
correspondence audits....
TRAC called correspondence audits, which are conducted
through the mail, "comparatively superficial" to audits conducted in
person.
Id. Indeed, a recent audit conducted by the Inspector General for Tax Administration's
office stated that "[a]s of September 2004, approximately 4.2% of the examinations
initiated for large businesses involved the LIFE process." Memorandum from Pamela
J. Gardiner, Deputy Inspector General for Audit, for Commissioner, Large and Mid-Size
Business Division (Feb. 18, 2005), in The Limited Issue Focused Examination Process
Has Merit, but its Use an Productivity Are Concerns, Ref. No.: 2005-30-029 (Feb.
2005), at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2005reports/
200530029fr.pdf (hereinafter LIFE Audit Memo). Of course, even if correspondence
audits played a significant role, they represent a similar audit policy to LIFE - namely
to sacrifice thoroughness in the name of efficiency.
106. Alison Bennett, Taxpayer Satisfaction With Larger Audits Relatively
High, but Tied to Time, IRS Finds, 154 BNA Daily Tax Report G-2, G-2 (Aug. 11,
2004).
107. Kurt Ritterpusch, Ungar Details Programs to Accelerate LMSB Audits,
Adaptation to New Tax Law, 213 BNA Daily Tax Report G-9, G-9 (Nov. 4, 2004).
108. Statement ofTimothyJ. McCormally, Executive Director, Tax Executives
Institute, Inc., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, (Mar. 30, 2004), at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id= 1318.
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An informal survey of TEI members recently
confirmed that LMSB's LIFE initiative - which focuses on
materiality of issues and risk analysis of issues to be audited -
is streamlining the examination process. We understand that
LMSB's interim review of LIFE validates this conclusion, and
accordingly strongly recommend that future initiatives be
designed to complement and supplement these programs, not
replace or supplant them."°
The fact that both the IRS and the taxpayers have such a positive
opinion of LIFE could be viewed optimistically as rare agreement by the
government and the taxpayers that a government program can fairly tax citizens
while improving government efficiency. Pessimistically, and more realistically,
such agreement could signal that one of the sides is not correctly perceiving the
program's consequences. One must ask the question: if faster audit times really
result in fair collection of revenue as well as an increased frequency of audits,
why would such a program excite taxpayers? The answer to this question must
be found in some of the criticisms that have been leveled against LIFE.
B. Public Arguments Attacking LIFE
While the IRS and LMSB taxpayers have gone to great lengths to tout
LIFE's advantages, the program has several problems that take the petals off the
rose. Contrary to the IRS's belief, LIFE inappropriately sacrifices audit quality
for reduced audit time. That sacrifice can directly lead to taxpayer manipulation.
Second, LIFE's inappropriate use of discretion irreparably damages the rule of
law. In addition, LIFE violates the IRS's duty to treat taxpayers consistently.
Finally, LIFE is premised on a faulty assumption that there are morally good
corporate taxpayers and that the IRS can identify them.
1. LIFE Sacrifices Thoroughness and Enables Taxpayer Manipulation
- Although the IRS's top officials have been touting LIFE's successes, voices
from IRS auditors have raised several concerns regarding LIFE. These auditors
state that LIFE provides a much too rigid audit formula that results in a vastly
increased potential for fraudulent taxpayer activity to go undetected." ° One
auditor quoted in the Washington Post summarized this complaint:
109. Id.
110. Weisman, supra note 97; Glass Jacobson, supra note 8, at 1-2.
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"There used to be a point of no return, where when you found
something wrong, you were there, and you were going to stay
there," said one corporate tax auditor, who spoke only on
condition of anonymity out of fear of being fired. "There was
no way they were going to get you out, and you had the power
of the IRS behind you.
"Now, even if you find the adjustment, find actual fraud,
management is still throwing you out of the building," the
auditor said."'
In addition, some IRS officials have complained "that accounting firms
and corporate tax offices are too plugged in to what the IRS is focusing on....
Focusing on particular issues simply changes the behavior of tax cheats."
' ' 2
Even LIFE's creators are questioning its current use. Larry Langdon
believes that Commissioner Everson's focus on using LIFE as a sword to cut
down audit times so drastically is a misuse of the program." 3 Langdon stated
that he originally intended LIFE to be used on around 25% of LMSB audits,
which would decrease the time of those audits but would not affect the overall
time of LMSB audits." 4 According to Langdon, to achieve Everson's goals, the
LMSB would have to use LIFE on nearly 75% of its audits, defeating
Langdon's original goal only to use LIFE on taxpayers with a good track record
of compliance."'
B. John Williams Jr., the former IRS chief counsel, echoed Langdon's
concerns about the overuse of LIFE. Williams stated that "[b]y declaring that
audits should take 15 to 18 months, Everson is virtually guaranteeing that IRS
auditors will miss tax dodges, fail to explore suspicious transactions, or even
walk away from audits that are on the verge of finding wrongdoing.""' 6
I 11. Weisman, supra note 97.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. These misses and failures could have profound economic effects:
[T]he statistics show LIFE cases are generating less additional
recommended taxes than other large business examinations, which
could impact tax revenues. [O]ur analysis indicates [if the IRS
allocated] 5% of the available examinations [of large businesses to
the LIFE process] over the next 5 years, the amount of recommended
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Indeed, because of the IRS's new policy of secrecy, it is impossible for
the public to determine if LIFE is playing a significant role in achieving
Everson's efficiency goals, especially in light of a recent Inspector General for
Tax Administration audit indicating a more limited use of LIFE." 7 In its quest
to demonstrate increased audit rates, the IRS may be hiding something. To
know for sure whether LIFE is the cause of the efficiency increase is currently
not possible because the IRS has been withholding some of the information
necessary to attribute the reported increase to LIFE.
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) has gathered
data indicating that:
While the overall audit rate for corporations has
continued to decline, the FY 2004 rates for the larger corporate
returns with assets of $10 million or more increased for the
first time in many years. Still the FY 2004 rates for these are
only a fraction of what they were a decade ago."'
TRAC, however, indicated that it was having difficulty explaining this
recent increase in LMSB audit rates because of the IRS's refusal to provide
TRAC with all of the information it needed to conduct an informed analysis:
The reality behind this very recent increase in the audits of
larger corporations is not clear, partly because the IRS
currently is withholding essential data. Because the IRS has
refused to make public supporting details to back up
Commissioner Everson's official statements or to provide other
material about a wide range of other IRS enforcement
activities, fully documenting what the agency is doing, and not
doing, has become more and more difficult. The agency's
additional taxes could drop an average of $349 million a year ($1.7
billion over 5 years).
LIFE Audit Memo, supra note 105, at 6, 7. One shudders to estimate what the impact
if Langdon's goal of 25% use of LIFE were implemented, much less if LIFE were used
in 75% of the audits, the number Langdon anticipated would be necessary to achieve
Everson's goals. See Section V.B. 1.
117. Life Audit Memo, supra note 105.
118. Corporate Audit Rates - Wide Disparities Found in Different Industries,
at http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/latest/current/ (last visited Jun.6, 2005).
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current closed-door policy reverses information practices that
have been generally followed for the last three decades." 9
Such limited disclosure combined with the IRS's refusal to disclose all of the
documents in this author's FOIA request supports the conclusion that the IRS
is creating a secret law through LIFE without any accountability. 20
Some insight can be obtained by a TRAC analysis performed on data
from the first half of 2004. "The group said IRS data showed a 10% decline in
the time spent on examinations of moderately sized corporations in the first half
of FY 2004, while time spent on audits of the largest companies dropped by
33%, TRAC said."'' TRAC believed that such a decline in thoroughness of the
audits of large corporations could have greatly contributed to the fact that the
IRS concluded that substantially less additional taxes discovered through
corporate audits were due in the first half of 2004 than in 2003.122 TRAC
concluded that the LMSB "has tried to hold the line on audit coverage by
allowing the time allocated for each audit to slip.' 23 Thus, this data contradicts
the IRS's claim that it can decrease audit times while maintaining audit
thoroughness.
The IRS has summarily dismissed many of these complaints against the
program with little acknowledgment of their possible merit. The Internal
Revenue Manual states succinctly that "[t]he establishment of a materiality
threshold(s) will not impact the examiner's responsibility to verify the proper
computation of tax liability."'' 24 The Internal Revenue Manual, however, does
not say how an auditor can ascertain the correctness of any return while
ignoring all but a few items that warrant audit.
Other IRS officials have offered a better answer to the negative
comments. They have argued that "their analytical techniques, along with their
knowledge of the company's history, will prevent taxpayers from using the
LIFE process to divert attention from scams and abuses.' 25 This statement is,
119. Id. See Section IV.B, supra, for a more detailed discussion of the
information that the IRS has withheld regarding LIFE.
120. See supra Section IV.B.
121. Alison Bennett, TRAC Says Pace of Corporate Audits Headed Toward
New Low in Fiscal 2004, 211 BNA Daily Tax Report G-2, G-3 (Nov. 2, 2004). Note
that the IRS has criticized TRAC's arguments because the IRS does not believe that
accurate conclusions can be derived from data that only reflects six months. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(5) (2004).
125. Crenshaw, supra note 9.
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of course, tacit recognition of the fact that LIFE offers taxpayers new
opportunities to cheat. In the first place, LIFE requires one to ignore all but a
few issues that warrant audit. LIFE is premised on the fact that many items that
warrant audit will be intentionally ignored. Furthermore, how can the auditors
have a strong knowledge of a company's history if it has been audited only once
in twenty years? Deborah Nolan has also relied on the LIFE audit procedures
as an inherent obstacle to abuse of LIFE because these procedures "allow
auditors to follow trails off audit plans if solid evidence indicates problems."' 26
One of the more telling statements that the IRS has made regarding
these complaints occurs in an internal, frequently-asked-questions document
that the IRS prepared regarding LIFE. In response to the question of whether it
would be possible for the auditor to "determine the issues that will have
substantial noncompliance without getting into the books and records of the
taxpayer," the entire answer was as follows:
The LIFE process may change the way you conduct
your examination. After conducting your full risk analysis,
LIFE involves increased communication and interaction with
the taxpayer as well as materiality considerations in
setting/narrowing your initial scope. Inherent in the process is
examining issues with the greatest compliance risk in a shorter
timeframe due to increased involvement of the taxpayer. Once
you have identified an account or a transaction, you should be
communicating with the taxpayer, having them explain the
transaction to you, rather than issuing a series of IDRs. The
examination techniques that you use to determine that the
taxpayer has reasonably complied with the law do not
change. "'27
This double-speak makes it clear that the IRS understands the problem,
has no answer, and has determined to ignore its implications. By merely stating
that the audit process will change, the IRS has managed to answer the question
without answering it at all. Nothing in the above statement actually addresses
the concern over whether the shortened audit process could have drastic
thoroughness ramifications.
126 Weisman, supra note 97. Also see Section III.C.2, supra, for a discussion
of how an audit can be expanded without regard to materiality thresholds if the auditor
discovers certain types of abuse.
127. First LIFE FAQ, supra note 37, at 3 (emphasis in original).
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The IRS is not convincingly addressing the merits of these arguments
against LIFE. The IRS's attitude seems to be "trust us, we can handle it."
Merely stating that the complaints are without substance is not an answer to
them. The IRS needs to be much more persuasive in explaining how it is
effectively handling the concerns over LIFE leading to a lack of thoroughness
and potential taxpayer abuse. Imagining how the IRS can do this, however, is
difficult because it defies logic to argue that limiting the issues to be addressed
and utilizing materiality thresholds to curb audit scope expansion will not
compromise the thoroughness of those audits.
2. LIFE Hurts the Rule of Law - Although LIFE involves very little
discretion once the issues are selected and the materiality thresholds are set, the
decision of whether or not to use LIFE as well as the issue selection and
threshold determination are highly discretionary. Larry Langdon recognized this
when he instituted LIFE, and he stated in an internal memorandum in the LIFE
training manual:
I recognize that the LIFE Process is not appropriate for all
examinations. I also realize that there will be instances when
we have agreed to conduct a LIFE examination but
circumstances require that it be terminated. I will be relying on
your judgment to determine when the use of this process
should be employed, as well as when the process should be
terminated.'2
This discretion over which taxpayers should be eligible for LIFE, as well as the
discretion in issue selection and materiality threshold determination, present
significant problems if one assumes that the tax system should favor rule of law
values.
Edward Morse has argued that "[r]ule-based constraint is likely to
enhance efficiency in tax administration and protect taxpayer rights to a greater
degree than a discretionary approach to justice."' 9 Although discretion cannot
be completely removed from the tax system, it must be contained to preserve the
rule of law. 3' Too much discretion in a rule-based system is problematic
128. Memorandum from Larry Langdon to LMSB Employees (Oct. 21, 2002),
reprinted in LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at ii.
129. Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the rule of law and "Clear Reflection
of Income:" What Constrains Discretion?, 8 Comell J.L & Pub. Pol'y 445, 451 (1999).
130. Id. at 448.
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because it creates distrust in a decisionmaker's ability to apply rules consistently
and fairly.' In addition, "[d]iscretion also threatens the internal morality of law
by undermining the notice and publicity requirement of rules."' 32 LIFE
exemplifies these destructive characteristics of an audit system that has too
much uncontrolled discretion.
An audit is inherently discretionary. It is properly up to Treasury to
determine which taxpayers and what issues should be audited consistent with
ascertaining a tax return's correctness. While such discretion might injure the
rule of law, it does not destroy it entirely.
LIFE, however, greatly and inappropriately expands this discretion. In
LIFE, the LMSB has created an audit program that it will apply to taxpayers on
a discretionary basis. In addition, the program's authorization of an auditor to
select only a few of many identified issues for audit provides the IRS with the
discretion to intentionally ignore information relevant to ascertaining the
correctness of a return. Thus, with this system, the discretion that the IRS has
solely on the basis of its own authority now directly conflicts with the IRS's
legislatively granted authority to examine relevant information (and not to
ignore it intentionally) to ascertain the correctness of a return.13' The problems
with such discretion are compounded by the fact that the IRS is not enacting
LIFE through the promulgation of regulations. As Morse points out:
Deference to agency interpretations embodied in prospectively
applicable regulations does not present a significant threat to
rule of law values. Changing the locus of rulemaking from the
Legislative to the Executive branch may implicate other
concerns, but regulations with rule-like characteristics provide
taxpayers with notice of their obligations and facilitate
planning. Moreover, they facilitate consistent treatment of
taxpayers by announcing the official agency position to those
who must enforce those rules.'34
Not only does LIFE signify an increase in the IRS's discretion with
questionable legislative support, it does so without Treasury adopting the
program through specific regulations that could lessen its damage to the rule of
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Section IV, supra, for a more complete discussion of whether or not
the IRS has the authority to conduct LIFE.
134. Morse, supra note 129, at 485-86 (citations omitted).
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law.'35 Furthermore, it has determined to keep secret two critical elements of the
program - the issues it is selecting and the manner in which materiality
thresholds are determined.'36 Thus, LIFE effectively gives auditors discretion
to secretly change the law as it applies to a particular taxpayer.
3. LIFE Violates the IRS's Duty to Treat Taxpayers Consistently -
Another problem with LIFE is that it violates the government's duty to treat
taxpayers consistently.'37 While there is some debate as to the extent of the duty
of consistency,' the general rule appears to be, unless there is a rational basis
to treat taxpayers differently, they should be treated similarly 39 Even a
publication by the Tax Executives Institute, an organization that enthusiastically
supports LIFE, stated that there could be a potential duty of consistency
problem because "[o]ne examiner may establish more stringent materiality
limits and audit more items than another examiner who is more liberal with the
threshold."1 40
In response to this concern, the IRS believes it can treat taxpayers
consistently regarding the use of materiality thresholds without establishing any
specific guidelines. In establishing its materiality guidelines both for issue and
threshold selection, the IRS has stated that producing specific guidelines for
135. The only apparent regulatory authority is the permissive language in Regs.
§ 301.7602-1 (a) discussed earlier in Section IV. This general regulatory language is not
specific enough to satisfy the uncertainty that threatens the rule of law.
136. See supra Section IV.B.
137. This problem is ironic considering that the IRS's press release announcing
LIFE stated: "LIFE is an effort by LMSB to institutionalize best practices and provide
consistency in the treatment of taxpayers." IRS News Release IR-2002-133 (Dec. 4,
2002).
138. See Molly Moses, Uphill Battle Predicted for Glaxo on APA
Discrimination Claim, 94 BNA Daily Tax Report J- 1, J-3 (May 17, 2004) (comparing
recent cases indicating a duty of consistency with those that indicate that the IRS is not
required to treat current taxpayers consistently with prior erroneous treatment).
139. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. U.S., 403 F.3d 793, 797 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing
Oshkosh Truck Corp. v. U.S., 123 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
140. James A. Dougherty & Rona M. Faust, IRS Instills New "Life' Into its
Audits -- limited issue Focused Examinations, Tax Executive, (Jan.-Feb. 2003), at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m6552/is1_55/ai_98416259. Of course,
perhaps because of TEI's enthusiasm over the program, the authors tempered their
concern by mentioning several mitigating factors: "The first is that the examiner should
seek input in determining the thresholds from IRS specialists and the taxpayer.
Furthermore, ifthe taxpayer disagrees with the materiality level, the taxpayer should ask
to speak to the team manager." Id.
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determining materiality is impossible. 4 ' Nevertheless, the IRS has stated it can
provide equal treatment to taxpayers by applying a consistent process in
determining materiality.'42 Despite this emphasis on consistency, the IRS states
that an auditor's discretion is essential in determining materiality.'43 In fact,
when compiling its initial frequently asked questions about LIFE, the LMSB
responded to the question of whether or not it was attempting to create blanket
materiality thresholds for all taxpayers as follows:
Absolutely not! No two taxpayers are identical. The
differences in location, size, business practices, industries, etc.,
make it impossible and impractical to set one standard. For this
reason, provided [sic] examples to demonstrate different ways
to establish materiality and encourage agents to use
professional judgment in conjunction with a methodology that
they believe is appropriate.'"
What the IRS perhaps does not realize in its response, however, is that
the use of materiality thresholds will, by definition, result in the inherent
inconsistent treatment of taxpayers. The fact that taxpayers are not identical
does not mean that they cannot be treated relatively equally. The more
discretion that is given in an audit process, however, the more unlikely it is for
this consistent treatment to occur. Thus, LIFE's discretionary side creates as
many problems as its overly rigid aspects, indicating that LIFE does not
integrate necessary discretion properly into the audit process. Furthermore, the
IRS's response does nothing to address the fact that taxpayers outside of the
LMSB's jurisdiction are not even eligible to participate in LIFE. If LIFE is so
beneficial and does not result in the problems already discussed, what rational
basis could there be for not applying it to all audits?
141. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.4(2) (2004).
142. See, e.g., I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.4(2) (2004); LIFE Training Manual, supra note
19, at 8-9; First LIFE FAQ, supra note 37, at 7, 9; LIFE Consolidated FAQ, supra note
31, at 8.
143. I.R.M. 4.51.3.3.5(10) (2004); LIFE Training Manual, supra note 19, at 10-
12, 18.
144. First LIFE FAQ, supra note 37, at 9-10 (emphasis in original). The
Internal Revenue Manual echoes this statement: "A threshold(s) set for one period or
taxpayer should not be automatically extended to either another taxpayer or another
period for the same taxpayer. A separate risk analysis must be performed for each
examination." I.R.M. 4.51.3.4.5(6) (2004).
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4. LIFE is Premised on a Faulty Assumption Regarding Taxpayer
Honesty - If the rule of law suffers in the tax system, "citizens lose faith in the
fairness of the tax system and are less inclined to honor it."'45 Richard Lavoie
argues that today "[t]he rule of law is flagging as the system struggles with its
own mind-numbing complexity and revelations that many profitable
corporations and wealthy individuals pay little or no tax."'" As a result, while
taxpayers in the 1970s considered the tax system to be fair, today, after the
increase of corporate tax shelter activity in the 1990s, most taxpayers believe
that the system is unfair. 47
Lavoie argues that this failure of the rule of law has contributed to the
modem taxpayer rarely taking moral or ethical considerations into account
when deciding the taxpayer's level of compliance with the tax laws.'48 The
government should not expect taxpayers to rely on their own internal sense of
right and wrong as they consider their tax liability. 49 Rather, the government
should understand that taxpayers' behavior will be much more heavily
influenced by issues such as the taxpayer's determination of the likelihood of
being caught and punished. 50
For corporations, this failure of morality in tax planning is even starker
than for individuals. According to Lavoie, for the corporate tax planner
"[e]thical considerations about the moral appropriateness of playing games with
the tax system generally do not enter the calculus."'' Maximizing profits to
shareholders is much more likely to drive corporate executives making tax
145. Richard Lavoie, Subverting the rule of law: The Judiciary's Role in
Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 115, 176-77 (2004).
146. Id. at 181.
147. Id. at 181.
148. Id. Lavoie points out that:
For some the very concept that ethical considerations could impinge
on tax planning may seem absurd. After all, the appropriateness of
tax planning has long been accepted. Additionally, certain provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") were adopted with the
express goal of harnessing tax planning as a means of modifying
taxpayer behavior. However, while tax planning is permissible, tax
evasion is not. The gray area between the two falls under the domain
of tax ethics.
Id. at 175-76 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 121-22.
150. Id. at 121-22.
151. Id. at 186.
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compliance decisions, especially if the corporations are publicly traded. Such
profitability would necessarily include minimizing the corporation's tax
liability. This mindset has enormous implications for LIFE.
As discussed in section V.B.1, when LIFE was created, the LMSB
intended that it should only be used for a small number of LMSB taxpayers that
had good compliance histories and were therefore trustworthy. LIFE, however,
appears to be based on a faulty premise.'52 Assuming that any corporate
taxpayer can be trusted to pay its fair share is risky because of the non-ethically
based motives that drive taxpayer decisions today. Just because a corporation
has a good past track record does not mean that the government can trust that
corporation not to take advantage of the LIFE system. The more realistic
presumption is that if corporate taxpayers determine either through observation
or conversations amongst themselves that there are ways to manipulate the lack
of thoroughness inherent in the LIFE system without being caught, they will do
so. For example, if corporations determine that the IRS tends to look at similar
issues across the board or tends to set similar materiality thresholds, it will not
be difficult for those corporations to manipulate their transactions to take
advantage of this knowledge. Despite the government's contention that different
materiality thresholds will be used for each taxpayer, its reticence in disclosing
any hard data about what materiality thresholds are being used strongly suggests
that a discernible pattern applicable to a number of taxpayers exists. Although
the government technically states that it can terminate the LIFE audit if there is
an indication of fraud, there is only a slim chance of the government even
detecting this fraud because of the restrictions on looking outside specific
issues.
152. At least one other division of the IRS recognizes the faultiness of this
premise. Martha Sullivan, the director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division, in
describing her division's recent initiatives, stated: "'It's important to understand that a
balanced enforcement program has to have some across-the-board coverage. If you
don't, then the good taxpayers will start to become bad because they will start to think
we're not looking."' Stephen Joyce, IRS Shifting Enforcement Actions Regarding Tax-
Exempt Groups to Crack Down on Abuses, 98 BNA Daily Tax Report G- 12, G- 12 (May
23, 2005).
The IRS is not the only taxing entity that is operating from this faulty premise.
France has recently unveiled a plan to reform corporate audit procedures and improve
taxpayer response time. Lawrence J. Speer, France Unveils Blueprint for Simplifying
Return Filing, New Corporate Audit Limits, 213 BNA Daily Tax Report G-2 (Nov. 4,
2004). In commenting on the new plan, the French Finance Minister Nicolas Sarkozy
stated that "[o]ur idea is that taxpayers are honest, and that only a slight minority are
committing fraud." Id. at G-2.
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This potential for taxpayer abuse of LIFE undermines LIFE's goal of
relying upon increased audit coverage to lead to greater corporate compliance
and in increased revenue. LIFE will likely result in decreased, rather than
increased, corporate compliance as taxpayers manipulate their participation in
the program to their benefit. As a result, any increase in revenue obtained by
increasing the audit rate will be more than offset by the decreased revenue
resulting from the taxpayer abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although having insufficient resources is not a new problem for the
IRS, the agency is getting much more aggressive in its solutions to this problem
through a new policy of administrative activism. The expanded use of LIFE
reflects the IRS's clear vision to make the most of its very limited resources by
reducing audit times to perform as many audits as possible. This vision is also
evident in the fact that timesaving techniques are beginning to spread to other
IRS divisions." 3 The IRS cannot solve this problem by unilaterally
153. For example, the IRS is launching a pilot program in 2006 in which
virtually real-time audits will be used to detect abuse trends and provide better advice
to taxpayers. John Herzfeld, IRS to Launch Pilot Project to Speed Audits, Guidance
Process, Official Says, 188 BNA Daily Tax Report G-1 (Sept. 29, 2004). Furthermore,
the IRS has experimented with establishing artificial cutoffpoints on certain audit times:
"Though auditors may prefer to hold out to complete the "perfect audit," [Deputy IRS
Commissioner for Services and Enforcement Mark E.] Matthews said, 'the return on
investment for that last 50% or 70% of effort may not be that great."' Id. at G-1. In
addition, the LMSB is instituting other timesaving policies of its own to improve audit
currency. See Kenneth A. Gary, IRS Evaluating Comments on Enhancing Audit
Currency, 104 Tax Notes 887, 887 (Aug. 30, 2004); Glass Jacobson, supra note 8, at 3-
4.
In fact, the only sign that use of LIFE might be diminishing comes in the form
of it being potentially replaced by a "currency initiative" announced in 2004 that takes
an even more aggressive stance to emphasizing audit speed. Molly Moses, Practitioners
Say Hurried Audits Under Currency Initiative Leading to Incomplete Analyses in Large,
Complex Transfer Pricing Cases, 64 BNA Daily Tax Report J-I, J-I (Apr. 5, 2005):
We found, for example, the progress of implementing the LIFE
process was hindered by a new initiative, the Currency and Cycle
Time Improvement Initiative (Currency Initiative), that overlapped
with the implementation of the LIFE process and was more
aggressive in holding examiners accountable for closing
examinations. As a result, examiners gave the Currency Initiative a
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implementing procedures that possibly exceed its congressionally granted audit
authority. To do so would greatly damage the rule of law that is essential to the
tax system.
In addition, while LIFE is reducing audit times, it is doing so at too
great a price. LIFE has allowed too much discretion where none should exist
and limited discretion where more should be used. The very nature of the
system creates enormous problems due to a drastic decline in audit
thoroughness. As a result, the LMSB is giving corporate taxpayers an
opportunity to take advantage of LIFE to hide fraudulent activity. Even if LIFE
were just applied to "good" taxpayers as it was originally intended, such
taxpayers, especially at the large corporate level, probably do not exist. Despite
the IRS's efforts to prevent taxpayers from discovering detailed information
regarding how issue selection and materiality threshold determination are
established, corporate taxpayers will eventually learn from sharing information
with each other whether there is a discernible pattern that could aid in predicting
how the IRS determines these issues. Compounding these problems is the fact
that the IRS's lack of full disclosure regarding the program basically allows the
agency to create a secret law without any meaningful political accountability.
The solution is a simple one. The IRS needs to go to Congress. Either
Congress needs to increase the amount of resources going to the IRS so that the
LMSB is not forced to disregard information that could be highly relevant in
determining tax liability or Congress needs to give the IRS direct authority to
use techniques like LIFE. While congressional approval of LIFE would not
remove its problems, at least it would indicate that the people, through their
elected representatives, had consented to the trade-offs that accompany LIFE.
Congressional approval of LIFE is unlikely, however, because such approval
would lead to a negative reaction from the public and the media because of its
favorable treatment of large corporate taxpayers." Thus, increased resources
higher priority than the LIFE process, which had the effect of
reducing the number of LIFE cases.
Id. (quoting from a Feb. 18, 2004 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
Report).
154. Of course, direct congressional disapproval of LIFE could be equally as
unlikely because Congress might not want to be seen as opposing a program that is so
popular with corporate America. This would not be the only example of Congress doing
nothing while the IRS gives too much to corporations.
For example, the Senate Finance Committee recently investigated the IRS's
Advance Pricing Agreement Program ("APA"), "wherein the IRS cuts transfer pricing
deals with large corporate taxpayers." Lee A. Sheppard, Draft Senate Finance APA
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for IRS enforcement is the only solution that makes practical sense. Without
either of these solutions, however, the IRS has greatly overstepped its function.
A society that values the rule of law cannot tolerate this result, even if done with
the best of intentions, because these intentions can pave the road to a place
where we dare not go.
Report Shows Incompetent IRS, 2005 Tax Notes Today 119-21, (June 22, 2005). The
APA is somewhat similar to LIFE in the sense that both programs involve an advance
agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS. "An APA is a binding contract between
the IRS and a taxpayer by which the IRS agrees not to seek a transfer pricing adjustment
under IRC § 482 for a covered transaction if the taxpayer files its tax return for a
covered year consistent with the agreed transfer pricing method." Advance Pricing
A g r e e m e n t P r o g r a m, a t
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=96277,00.html.
The investigation resulted in a draft report that "points out.., that the program
is badly managed, and the IRS is giving away the store." Sheppard, supra note 154.
According to the draft report, rarely are taxpayers actually kicked out of the APA, and
some taxpayers are not paying tax because of transfer pricing. Id. Furthermore, there
was considerable movement of APA officials into the private sector, which resulted in
"some back scratching." Id. Although the specific revenue loss under the APA is
unknown, it is predicted "to be massive." Id. "Yet the report was widely expected to be
a whitewash, since senators on both sides of the aisle like the APA program because
business likes it. The Court of Appeals for Aggrieved Business is not about to kill a
program that business is happy with." Id.
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